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Abstract:       
 
Perhaps Greece -- a country with a debt to GDP already approaching 150 
percent and set to move even higher -- avoids a debt restructuring.  Perhaps 
not.  
 
What are the possible scenarios if Greece cannot return to the capital 
markets to refinance this gargantuan debt stock once its EU/IMF bailout 
package expires in two years time?   What would a Greek debt restructuring 
look like after mid-2013?   And (sharp intake of breath here) what would 
happen if such a debt restructuring were undertaken before that point? 
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At about this time last year, we wrote a short paper entitled “How to 
Restructure Greek Debt.”2  The intervening months have seen the following 
major events in the Eurozone debt crisis: 
 In May 2010, Greece concluded an agreement with the 
Eurozone member states, with the backing of the IMF, for 
access to a €110 billion facility (€80 billion from the Eurozone 
and €30 billion from the IMF).3  That amount was judged to 
be sufficient to allow Greece to repay -- in full and on time -- 
all public sector debts maturing during the three-year IMF 
program period and to cover anticipated budget deficits 
during that period.  One objective of this total bailout of 
Greece was to staunch any risk of contagion to the other 
European peripheral countries. 
 The European Central Bank promptly embarked on a 
program of open market purchases of Greek and other 
Eurozone periphery debt in order to “ensure an orderly 
monetary policy transmission mechanism.”4  This program 
continues, in fits and starts, as of this writing.  The ECB is 
thought now to own €40-50 billion of Greek sovereign bonds 
purchased in the secondary market. 
                                                 
1 Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (New York) and Professor, Duke Law School, 
respectively. 
2 Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603304.  The published 
version of this paper can be found at Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Restructuring a Nation’s 
Debt, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. 46 (June 2010).  A copy is attached to this document. 
3 See Ronald Janssen, Greece and the IMF:  Who Exactly is Being Saved?  CEPR Draft (July 
2010) (available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/greece-imf-2010-07.pdf). 
4 See Ansgar Belke, Driven by the Markets?  ECB Sovereign Bond Purchases and the Securities Market 
Program, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Working Paper (June 2010) (available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201006/20100610ATT75796/20100610ATT75796
EN.pdf). 
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 On October 18, 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy took a stroll on a beach in 
Deauville, France.  When they returned holding hands (in a 
figurative sense, naturally), they announced plans to alter the 
EU treaty to put in place a permanent “crisis management 
system” that would include provisions to ensure the 
“adequate participation of private creditors”.5  Unfortunately, 
Mr. Sarkozy and Mrs. Merkel did not confide to the markets 
precisely what this “adequate participation” entailed.  
Predictably, the markets assumed the worse, resulting in a 
sell-off of Eurozone periphery sovereign debt.6  Yields on that 
paper moved sharply higher. 
 In late November 2010, Ireland asked for, and received, its 
own €85 billion bailout package, also with IMF conditionality.7   
 To calm the markets after the Deauville adventure, the finance 
ministers of the five biggest EU member states announced on 
November 28, 2010 that “any private sector involvement [in 
Eurozone sovereign debt restructurings] … would not be 
effective before mid-2013”.8  In other words, investors were 
assured -- or thought they had been assured -- that all existing 
Eurozone sovereign debt instruments would be immune from a 
debt restructuring. 
 On March 8, 2011, Greece filed a registration statement with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enabling the 
country to issue bonds to “diaspora” Greek investors at rates 
significantly below market.9 
                                                 
5 See Erick Nielsen, Eurozone Bond Haircuts Must Look Appealing, Financial Times, November 
9, 2010. 
6 See Peter Spiegel, Anger at Germany Boils Over, Financial Times, November 16, 2010; Simon 
Tilford, Eurozone Politicians are Playing with Fire, CER Insight, November 15, 2010. 
7 See Ian Traynor, IMF and EU bail out Ireland amid fears of Eurozone contagion, The Guardian, 
November 22, 2010. 
8 Statement by the Eurogroup, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf 
9 A Greek Diaspora Bond Odyssey, Financial times (Alphaville), March 9, 2011 (available at 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/03/09/509211/a-greek-diaspora-bond-odyssey/). 
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 On April 6, 2011, as this paper was being written, Portugal 
asked the European Union for financial assistance.10 
 March 23, 2011 saw the release of a term-sheet for a 
permanent facility to assist distressed Eurozone sovereigns 
after 2013, the European Stabilization Mechanism (“ESM”).  
The term sheet makes clear that ESM loans will be given 
preferred creditor status.11  A similar claim to preferred 
creditor status has not been made (or at least not yet been 
made) for the €80 billion EU contribution to the Greek bailout 
package. 
 Last month, the Greek Finance Minister said publicly that 
even the €110 billion EU/IMF facility might not be enough to 
tide Greece over until 2013.12   
To date, one or more of the following concerns about permitting a 
restructuring of Eurozone sovereign debt have induced the official sector to 
continue a policy of total bailouts of all afflicted countries. 
 Contagion.  Confronted with a debt restructuring in one 
country, will the markets recoil from all peripheral Eurozone 
countries, perhaps sparking a general crisis? 
 Effect on banks.  Eurozone commercial banks hold the lion’s 
share of Greek sovereign bonds.  A debt restructuring that 
significantly reduced the balance sheet valuation of these 
assets could threaten the solvency of some institutions, 
perhaps requiring a recapitalization from the host 
government. 
 Honi soit qui mal y pense.  Would a Eurozone sovereign debt 
restructuring indelibly stain the reputation of the Euro and 
perhaps even undermine the foundations of the monetary 
union itself? 
                                                 
10 See Peter Wise and Peter Spiegel, Portugal appeals for EU bail-out, Financial Times, April 7, 
2011. 
11 See the Eurozone’s ESM Permanent Bailout Fund, Financial Mirror, March 23, 2011 (available 
at http://www.financialmirror.com/Columnist/Global_Markets/752). 
12 Id. 
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Although each of these constraints is still present to some degree 
one year after the Greek debt crisis erupted, it is no longer obvious that they, 
individually or in aggregate, continue to justify complete paralysis.  The markets 
have had an opportunity to focus on the differences in the financial positions of 
the various peripheral Eurozone countries.  Putting aside the obvious fact that 
the policy of total official sector bailouts has not prevented contagion (see Ireland 
and Portugal), blind indiscriminate contagion has diminished as a risk.  As for the 
commercial bank holders, they have been given a year to sell or hedge 
exposures, or otherwise provision against an eventual hit to the value of their 
Greek positions.  Some are no doubt still uncomfortably exposed, but this list 
should be smaller than it was a year ago.  (It is not clear to us whether all banks 
have in fact made hay while this sun has been shining, but they have at least 
been given a chance to do so.) 
We have now been asked to update our earlier assessment of the 
Greek debt situation in light of these developments.  In particular, we have been 
asked to speculate on possible endgame scenarios for the Greek debt crisis. 
We divide these scenarios into three groups:  (i) Greece goes the 
distance with the current IMF/EU program and a debt restructuring is avoided 
altogether, (ii) a debt restructuring of some kind becomes unavoidable after June 
2013 when the EU’s “read my lips -- no restructuring until 2013” promise lapses 
by its terms, and (iii) a liability management transaction affecting some or all of 
the Greek debt stock is launched before 2013. 
The Official Scenario -- Greece Goes the Distance 
Under this scenario -- which enjoys the public support of Greece’s 
official sector sponsors (the IMF and the EU) as well as the Greek authorities 
themselves -- Greece will stick with its program of fiscal austerity for the full three 
years.  At the end of that period (apparently the initial prediction of renewed 
market access in 2012 has now been withdrawn), Greece returns to the capital 
markets to refinance its maturing debt and fund amortizations due on the EU/IMF 
bailout loans.  The markets, this theory contends, will be so impressed with the 
turnaround in Greece’s fiscal position that private sector monies will be advanced 
in sufficient quantities and at tolerable interest rates to permit Greece to resume 
normal rollovers of its maturing debts.  Over time, Greece will run primary budget 
surpluses and will begin to nibble at its (admittedly) colossal debt stock.  This, 
says the official sector, is the benignant future that awaits both Greece and all of 
its lenders. 
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The Risks 
 On its current path, the Greek public sector debt in 2013 will 
represent 150-170% of GDP.  Moreover, more than half of 
that debt stock will by then be in the hands of official sector 
creditors (the EU, the ECB and the IMF), at least one of 
which (the IMF) claims for itself preferred creditor status.  Will 
the private capital markets really be eager to resume 
financing a country in this precarious position? 
 Two more long years of fiscal austerity lay ahead for Greece.  
Will the Greek politicians be able to hold the social/political 
consensus together that long? 
 What happens if Greece begins to miss its IMF performance 
targets?  Will the IMF and EU casually relax the conditionality 
so that drawdowns can continue under the €110 billion 
facility, or might German parliamentarians insist on taking a 
harder line?  Waiving compliance with the fiscal performance 
targets in order to avoid a debt default, of course, risks 
sending this message to other prospective borrowers from 
official sector bailout facilities:  “Eurozone countries in 
financial distress can expect assistance from the EU and IMF 
in two -- but only two -- circumstances:  (i) when those 
countries adopt and stick to stern fiscal austerity programs or 
(ii) when they don’t”. 
 The €110 billion facility was intended by its authors to be an 
overwhelming demonstration of financial firepower -- a 
veritable Hank Paulson bazooka.  If this was the antidote to 
contagion, however, it failed.  Ireland has succumbed.  So 
has Portugal.  If one of these other countries decides to 
pursue a debt restructuring before 2013, might not that 
precedent fuel calls for something similar in Greece? 
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Post-2013 Scenarios 
We see four possible scenarios if Greece is unable to regain 
market access in late 2013.  Three involve a post-2013 restructuring of the Greek 
debt stock, while one envisions that Greece muddles on for an indefinite period 
as a ward of the official sector.  
Scenario One:  The Official Sector Takes the Spear.  By June 
2013, more than one-half of the Greek debt stock will be in the hands of official 
sector lenders.  By significantly restructuring their own claims against the 
country, these official sector lenders could attempt to render Greece presentable 
to the private markets. 
The Risks 
 It is difficult (read, nearly inconceivable) to envision a political 
environment that would permit the EU and ECB -- much less the 
IMF -- to sacrifice their taxpayers’ money in order to ensure full 
and timely repayment of commercial creditors, some of whom 
are earning yields in excess of 12%. 
 Will the EU carry the burden of such a restructuring alone, or 
will it expect the IMF to chip in?  And if the latter, what, if 
anything, will be left of the IMF’s sacrosanct “we never 
restructure” status? 
Scenario Two:  The Private Sector Creditors Take the Spear:  
Under this scenario, the holders of the remaining Greek debt stock still in private 
hands in mid-2013 will be presented with a restructuring proposal that effectively 
eviscerates the value of their paper. 
The Risks 
 Even a total write-off of that remaining one-third to one-half of 
the debt stock may not be enough to return Greece to 
creditworthiness. 
 These creditors will never go gentle into the good night of a total loss 
of value.  Something coercive, something truly ugly, will be needed to 
prod them into the abattoir.  What effect would this have on future 
lending to Greece or, for that matter, to other Eurozone sovereigns? 
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Scenario Three:  All Together Now.  The third alternative involves a 
joint debt restructuring by both official and private sector lenders sometime after 
the middle of 2013.  With private sector involvement, the official sector can’t be 
accused of mollycoddling commercial lenders; with official sector involvement, 
those commercial lenders would not face a total write off of the value of their 
claims. 
The Risks 
 Some might argue that this demonstration of fraternal solidarity will 
only end up alienating the affections of both groups, the official and the 
private lenders.  Would it not be better, they might argue, to keep one 
camp sweet for future borrowings? 
 Unless the terms of the two restructurings were calibrated to be 
equivalent in a net present value sense, this approach risks 
intercreditor jealousy and suspicion. 
Scenario Four:  Wardship.  Perhaps the paralyzing fear of a 
Eurozone sovereign debt restructuring will persist even after 2013 has come and 
gone.  If so, Greece could be relegated to the status of a ward of the official 
sector for an indefinite period. The remaining bonds in the hands of commercial 
lenders, and the amortizations due on the first round of EU/IMF loans, would 
presumably all be paid with the proceeds of drawings under successor official 
sector credit facilities.  After the passage of a few more years, virtually all of the 
Greek debt stock will then be owed to its official sector rescuers. 
The Risks 
 
 This could be politically unpalatable to the Greeks.  Someone is bound 
to say that when Greece took the first €110 bailout, this was equivalent 
to a bibulous landlubber accepting the King’s schilling from the 
sergeant of a Royal Navy press gang in order to buy one more round 
of drinks:  when the poor fellow wakes up in the morning he will be 
facing ten years before the mast in His Majesty’s service.   
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 It can’t be a very pleasant alternative for the official sector either. 
Pre-2013 Restructuring Scenarios 
 
If for any reason Greece cannot, or does not wish to, wait until mid-
2013 before addressing its debt stock (a decision that presumably would require 
at least the passive acquiescence of the EU, the IMF and the ECB), broadly 
speaking we see two possible scenarios. 
The EU’s post-Deauville assurance that there will never be a 
restructuring of an existing Eurozone sovereign debt instrument (at least until 
2013) presents something of an obstacle to any pre-2013 restructuring of 
Eurozone sovereign debt instruments.  The face-saving solution may be 
linguistic.  A voluntary liability management transaction undertaken by the debtor 
country before 2013, the argument goes, is not a “restructuring” as that term was 
used in the post-Deauville assurance.  Restructuring, it may be claimed, 
connotes a degree of coercion on the affected creditors.  But if the creditors 
themselves elect voluntarily to participate in a liability management transaction to 
improve the creditworthiness of their debtor, who in the official sector can or 
should gainsay that decision? 
Scenario One -- A Light Dusting.  One possibility would be to 
approach the private sector (principally northern European commercial bank) 
holders of Greek bonds with a mild restructuring proposal that limits, or even 
neutralizes altogether, any net present value loss they would suffer as a result of 
participating in the transaction.  A simple Uruguay-style13 reprofiling of the debt 
stock with no haircut to principal would fit this bill.  To ensure widespread creditor 
acceptance, some might urge that any new instrument issued to effect the 
restructuring benefit from credit enhancement (a partial guarantee from the 
official sector, for example, or collateral security à la Brady bonds) so as to 
neutralize the negative NPV consequences of the stretch-out of maturities.  One 
obvious motivation for a mild restructuring of this kind would be to cushion its 
effect on the balance sheets of overexposed northern European commercial 
banks.  A second motivation, of course, would be to move existing debt 
maturities beyond the current program period so as to liberate a portion of the 
€110 billion bailout facility for other purposes. 
                                                 
13 In 2003, Uruguay “reprofiled” its external debt stock by extending the maturity of each of its 18 
series of bonds by five years.  There was no haircut to principal; coupons were kept the same.  
See Lee C. Buchheit and Jeremiah S. Pam, Uruguay’s Innovations, 19 J. Int’l Banking L. and 
Reg. 28 (2004). 
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The Risks 
 Will such a light dusting of the debt stock return Greece to a 
sustainable position, or will it be just the first of a two stage 
restructuring with the real blood-letting deferred to stage two? 
 Neutralizing the negative NPV effect of a maturity stretch out by adding 
credit enhancements is expensive and contraindicated for a country 
facing a severe debt crisis.  But asking bondholders voluntarily to 
accept an NPV loss, however, will surely test the sponsors’ powers of 
persuasion. 
 Overexposed commercial banks that currently hold Greek sovereign 
paper in their “hold to maturity” book at or near par value may want an 
assurance that a transaction of this kind will not require an immediate 
marking of their positions to market values. 
Scenario Two:  The Full Monty.  For the sake of completeness, the 
final option would involve a full restructuring of the Greek debt stock prior to 2013 
in order to give the country a visibly sustainable debt profile as soon as possible.  
Such a restructuring would presumably look to cut the size of the debt stock in 
nominal terms as well as to iron out the maturity profile, all to the end of 
positioning Greece to return to the capital markets within a reasonable period of 
time following the closing of the transaction. 
The Risks 
 A Full Monty approach would require all concerned to jettison any 
illusions about sponsoring a wholly voluntary transaction. 
 This will lead to the usual discussion about how -- in the odious patois 
of investment bankers -- to “incentivize” the bondholders to participate.  
Change local law to compel participation (more than 90% of the debt 
stock is governed by Greek law)?  Threaten a payment default on any 
untendered bonds (the “abandon all hope ye who do not enter here” 
tactic)?  Declare any non-tendered bonds ineligible at the ECB 
discount window? 
 Having spent billions of Euros of taxpayer money to stave off any 
restructuring of Eurozone sovereign debt, will the political class in 
Europe really be prepared now to careen to the other extreme of 
countenancing a savage debt restructuring? 
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 A major tremor of this kind affecting the Greek debt would indeed be 
felt in Lisbon, Madrid and elsewhere in peripheral Europe. 
The Historical Perspective 
We have all been here before. 
In August of 1982, Mexico was forced to declare a moratorium on 
the repayment of its external debt owed to commercial banks.  Over the course 
of the next two years, more than twenty other countries followed suit -- it later 
came to be called “the global debt crisis” of the 1980s. 
Then, as now, the lenders to these sovereigns were primarily 
commercial banks.  Then, as now, some of those banks were dangerously 
overexposed and could not have endured any significant writedown of the value 
of their sovereign credit portfolios.  Then, as now, the banks approached the 
official sector institutions asking that the official sector either lend the sovereign 
borrowers the money to continue normal debt service on their bank credits or, 
failing that, guarantee the banks’ loans. 
Then, unlike now, the banks were rebuffed.  The official sector flatly 
refused to bail the banks out of their bad credit decisions in the early 1980s.  But, 
in recognition of the balance sheet fragility of some of those institutions, the 
official sector (and in particular the U.S. Treasury) agreed to use its influence 
over the sovereign debtors to promote a debt restructuring technique that 
avoided any need for the banks to write down the value of their sovereign 
portfolios. 
This technique, later named after U.S. Treasury Secretary James 
Baker, had four components. 
 The debtor country was required to sign up to an IMF 
stabilization and adjustment program. 
 The principal of the banks’ loans was rescheduled over 
relatively brief periods -- 18 to 24 months. 
 Interest payments on those rescheduled loans, however, 
had to be kept current to avoid negative accounting 
consequences for the banks. 
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 Because many countries lacked the resources even to pay 
interest, the banks were compelled to lend the debtors “new 
money” which was then recycled back to the banks as 
interest payments on their existing exposure.14 
As the 1980s rolled sweetly on, the four elements of this Baker Plan 
debt restructuring technique were repeated, sometimes four or five times, in the 
afflicted debtor countries.  In public, Secretary Baker and others expressed 
fathomless confidence that the banks would never experience a loss on their 
sovereign credits.  Why?  The debtor countries, it was predicted, would after 
years of IMF tutelage “grow” out of their debt problems.  In private, however, the 
official sector players warned the commercial banks to begin provisioning their 
loan loss reserves against the possibility that a loss might someday materialize. 
After seven years of the Baker Plan, a new U.S. Treasury, Nicholas 
Brady, announced (on March 10, 1989) a shift in U.S. Government policy toward 
the management of the global debt crisis.  Secretary Brady encouraged the 
banks to write off a portion of their exposure to the debtor countries, and to 
stretch out repayment of the balance for 30 years, as a means of ending the 
global debt crisis in a single stroke.  And, more or less, the Brady Initiative did 
just that.  Banks swallowed (modest) losses on their sovereign portfolios; debtor 
countries regained (modest) market access; the banks’ loan loss reserve 
provisions (built up over the prior seven years) cushioned the balance sheet 
effect of the losses.  A banking crisis in the developed countries did not follow the 
launch of the Brady Initiative. 
The debt management technique adopted by Secretary Baker and 
his official sector colleagues in 1982 therefore had the effect of grabbing the 
commercial bank creditors by their noses and holding them in place as the 
lenders of record until a more durable solution to the problem could be 
implemented.  The concession made to the bank lenders at the time was a 
restructuring technique that avoided accounting losses while the banks were 
provisioning their loan loss reserves.  When the day of reckoning eventually 
arrived with Secretary Brady, the losses were felt by the bank creditors that had 
made the loans in the first place. 
                                                 
14 See Buchheit, “Whatever Became of Old New Money”, Int’l Fin. Law Review, December 1990. 
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Contrast this to the debt management technique being used in 
Europe in 2010-2011.  This time around, the official sector players are not 
holding the original lenders by the nose; the official sector is actually buying out 
the original lenders in full and on time as each existing bond matures and is paid 
by drawing down an official sector credit lines.  The difference is this -- if the 
sword of a debt restructuring must eventually fall in order to render Greece’s debt 
stock manageable (something that most economists view as inevitable), that 
sword will fall principally on the neck of the official sector lenders.  The original 
creditors will have swapped places in the tumbrel with official lenders quite 
literally in the shadow of the guillotine.  
 
 
* * * * 
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Abstract 
 
Plan A for addressing the Greek debt crisis has taken the form 
of a €110 billion financial support package for Greece announced by the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund on May 2, 2010.  A 
significant part of that €110 billion, if and when it is disbursed, will be used to 
repay maturing Greek debt obligations, in full and on time.  The success of 
Plan A is not inevitable; among other things, it will require the Greeks to 
accept -- and to stick to -- a harsh fiscal adjustment program for several 
years. 
If Plan A does not prosper, what are the alternatives?  And how 
quickly could a Plan B be mobilized and executed? 
This paper outlines the elements of one possible Plan B, a 
restructuring of Greece’s roughly €300 billion of government debt.  Prior 
sovereign debt restructurings provide considerable guidance for how such a 
restructuring might be shaped.  But several key features of the Greek debt 
stock could make this operation significantly different from any previous 
sovereign debt workouts. 
To be sure, a restructuring of Greek debt will not relieve the 
country from the painful prospect of significant fiscal adjustment, nor will it 
displace the need for financial support from the official sector.  But it may 
change how some of those funds are spent (for example, backstopping the 
domestic banking system as opposed to paying off maturing debt in full). 
This paper does not speculate about whether a restructuring of 
Greek debt will in fact become necessary or politically feasible.  It focuses 
only on the how, not the whether or the when, of such a debt restructuring. 
* * * * 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1603304
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This paper offers no opinion on whether Greece’s debt should 
be restructured and, if so, when or on what financial terms.  Nor does it 
speculate on what consequences, intended or unintended, might flow from 
such a restructuring.  We will limit ourselves solely to the issue of how such a 
restructuring might efficiently be undertaken -- drawing on the lessons of past 
sovereign debt restructurings (successful and otherwise) -- if a decision is 
made to proceed with a debt restructuring at some point in the future. 
Financial Aspects of the Debt Stock 
Greece’s total debt as of end-April 2010 was approximately 
€319 billion.  Of that figure, the vast majority -- approximately €294 billion -- 
was in the form of bonds, with another €8.6 issued as Treasury bills.   
Virtually all of this debt stock was denominated in Euros.  Small 
amounts (in aggregate, less than 2% of the total) are outstanding in U.S. 
dollars, Japanese yen and Swiss francs. 
Information about the holders of Greek bonds is anecdotal.  
From press reports, however, it appears that French and German banks 
have the heaviest exposures,1 but mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds 
and other categories of investors also own Greek bonds.  Significantly, the 
extent of retail (non-institutional) ownership appears to be small. 
                                            
*
 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, LLP 
**
 Duke University Law School 
1
 James Wilson et al., “Worries persist on exposure to Greece,” Fin. Times, April 30, 2010. 
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A significant amount of Greek bonds have been discounted by 
European commercial banks with the European Central Bank (“ECB”).  On 
May 3, 2010, the ECB announced that those bonds would continue to be 
eligible for discounting, notwithstanding the downgrading of Greek bonds 
below investment grade that occurred the prior week.2 
Legal Aspects of the Debt Stock 
Governing law.  From the legal standpoint, the salient feature of 
Greece’s bond debt is that approximately 90% of the total is governed by 
Greek law.  Only about €25 billion of the bond debt was issued under the law 
of another jurisdiction, and most of that under English law. 
Collective action clauses.  It does not appear from our survey 
of Greek bond documentation that the instruments issued under local law 
contain provisions permitting the holders to amend the terms of the bonds 
after issuance (other than to correct obvious errors or technical matters).  
Prior to 2004, Greek bonds issued under English law contained collective 
action clauses (“CACs”) that appear3 to permit holders of 66 percent of an 
issue to modify payment terms in a manner that would bind all other holders.  
After 2004, Greece altered this clause in its English law bonds.4  This new 
version of the CAC permits amendments to payment terms of a bond, as well 
as certain other key features of the instrument, with the consent of holders of 
75% or more of an issue. 
Negative Pledge.  Greece does not appear to have included a 
negative pledge clause in its bonds issued under local law. 
                                            
2
 See Press Release, ECB Announces Change in Eligibility of Debt Instruments Issued or 
Guaranteed by the Greek Government (May 3, 2010) available at 
http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100503.en.html). 
3
 We say “appear” because the descriptions of the modification clauses in the Offering 
Circulars for these bonds routinely conflate the notion of a quorum (that is, the number of 
bonds required to activate a meeting of bondholders) with the percentage of bonds required 
to approve an Extraordinary Resolution.  
4
 In 2002, a working group of the G-10 issued a report recommending reform of the standard 
sovereign debt contract.  See Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses 
(September 2002) (available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.htm).  The Report contained 
a recommended version of a collective action clause for sovereign bonds as well as other 
model clauses.  The new Greek CAC derives from this source. 
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The foreign law Greek bonds we have examined do contain a 
negative pledge clause, but in a very unusual form.  This clause requires 
Greece equally and ratably to secure each of these bond issues if ever it 
creates or permits to subsist any form of security interest over its revenues, 
properties or assets to secure any “External Indebtedness.” 
In the case of a typical emerging market sovereign bond, 
external indebtedness is defined to cover borrowings denominated in a 
currency other than the currency of the issuing State.  And so it was with 
Greek bonds issued prior to January 1, 2000 when the Euro was adopted as 
the common currency of the European Union.  After that date, however, the 
Euro became the “lawful currency” of Greece.  But Greece’s form of negative 
pledge clause did not change for more than four years after the adoption of 
the Euro5; the “lawful currency” just quietly ceased being the Drachma and 
became instead the Euro.  In practical terms, this means that Greece’s 
negative pledge clause in its foreign law bonds issued prior to 2004 would 
only be triggered by the creation of a lien to secure a non Euro-denominated 
Greek debt. 
Events of Default.  Most of the Greek bonds we have examined 
incorporate a standard set of Events of Default (variations can be found in a 
few bonds).  These include: 
• failure to pay interest (with a 30-day grace period); 
• other covenant defaults (with a 30-day grace period after 
written notice to the issuer); 
• “External Indebtedness” (above a de minimis threshold) is 
accelerated, or a payment is missed under such External 
                                            
5
 Starting in 2004, the definition of “External Indebtedness” in Greece’s foreign law-governed 
bonds changed.  Under the new version of the definition, indebtedness for borrowed money 
is “External” if either (i) it is denominated in a currency other than Euros or (ii) borrowed from 
foreigners under a foreign law-governed contract.  This change in Greece’s standard bond 
documentation occurred at roughly the same time as the country began using a CAC 
modeled on the G-10 recommended clause, and adopted a 25% voting threshold for 
acceleration (also recommended by the G-10). 
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Indebtedness and continues beyond the specified grace 
period;6 
• a general moratorium is declared on “External 
Indebtedness”; and 
• any government order or decree prevents Greece from 
performing its obligations under the bonds. 
The important point to note here is that the cross-acceleration, 
cross-default and moratorium event of default clauses in these bonds apply 
only to External Indebtedness; a term that in Greek bonds issued prior to 
2004 excludes Euro-denominated obligations.  Thus, these Events of Default 
in pre-2004 bonds could only be triggered by an event affecting the small 
amount of Greek debt that is denominated in currencies other than Euros.  
Stated differently, a payment default on a Greek Euro-denominated bond, or 
the acceleration of such an instrument, would not have cross-default 
consequences across much of the debt stock.7 
Bondholder remedies.  Prior to 2004 (when Greece adopted a 
new form of CAC), individual bondholders could accelerate their bonds 
following the occurrence of an Event of Default.  Bonds issued after that time 
incorporate a requirement that holders of 25% of the bonds vote in favor of 
an acceleration -- one of the provisions recommended by the G-10 Working 
Group on Contractual Clauses in 2002.  (Individual rights of acceleration are 
now rarely found in emerging market sovereign bonds.) 
Greece in a Restructuring Context 
 
Greece would enjoy some distinct advantages in the 
restructuring of its debt, as well as a few disadvantages, in comparison with 
other countries that have been forced to undergo the process. 
Advantages   
• Greece’s debt is overwhelming in the form of bonds, a 
characteristic shared by countries like Argentina (2001-05), 
                                            
6
 These cross-acceleration and cross-default clauses appear in some, but not all, of 
Greece’s bonds issued under local law. 
7
 In Greek bonds issued after 2004, these Events of Default would be triggered by an event 
affecting Republic debt that was either non Euro-denominated or borrowed from foreigners 
under a foreign-law governed agreement. 
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Ecuador (2000) and Uruguay (2003).  Greece will therefore 
be able to avoid the complexities and intercreditor rivalries 
that can be occasioned by a diverse creditor universe.  Iraq 
(2005-08), for example, faced a commercial creditor class 
composed of banks, suppliers, construction companies, 
various kinds of trade creditors and even individuals.  In the 
end, Iraq had to settle more than 13,000 individual claims 
dating back to the Saddam era. 
• Greece’s debt records are fresh and up to date.  When 
sovereign debts have been in default for prolonged periods 
before they are restructured (for example, Liberia (2009) -- 
more than 25 years in arrears; Iraq (2005-08) -- more than 
15 years in arrears), the task is much harder. 
• Greece enjoys considerable financial support from 
multilateral and bilateral sources. This opens up the 
possibility of being able to “credit enhance” any new Greek 
debt instrument that might be issued as part of a debt 
restructuring.  Greece is therefore in a position similar to the 
countries that issued collateralized Brady Bonds starting in 
1990. 
• Related to the last point, the odd nature of Greece’s 
negative pledge clauses noted above (the clauses in bonds 
issued prior to 2004 would not be triggered by the creation 
of liens to secure future Euro-denominated indebtedness of 
Greece) means that some form of collateralized Brady Bond 
approach might be legally feasible for Greece without 
having to obtain waivers of negative pledge restrictions in 
foreign law-governed instruments issued prior to 2004. 
• The fact that so few Greek bonds seem to have fallen into 
the hands of retail (non-institutional) investors may also be 
a blessing.  Those countries (for example, Argentina (2001-
05)), that have had to deal with thousands of retail 
bondholders in a debt restructuring have found this a messy 
and thankless task. 
• By far, however, the greatest advantage that Greece would 
enjoy in a restructuring of its debt derives from the fact that 
so much of the debt stock is expressly governed by Greek 
law (90% or more, if our figures are correct).  This raises the 
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possibility, discussed in more detail below, that the 
restructuring could be facilitated in some way by a change 
to Greek law. 
Several other countries have restructured local law-
governed debts.  Russia restructured Russian law-governed 
instruments known as GKOs and OFZs in 1998 in parallel 
with the restructuring of its English law commercial bank 
debt.  Uruguay restructured its local law bonds (on the 
same terms as its foreign law bonds) in 2003.  In each of 
these prior cases, however, the local law bonds were also 
denominated in local currency and formed only part of the 
overall stock of the debt being restructured.  While the Euro 
is certainly now the local currency of Greece, it is a good 
deal more besides that. 
No other debtor country in modern history has been in a 
position significantly to affect the outcome of a sovereign 
debt restructuring by changing some feature of the law by 
which the vast majority of the instruments are governed. 
Disadvantages 
Several features of the Greek situation may complicate any 
restructuring of its debt. 
• A significant percentage (perhaps more than 30 percent) of 
the bonds are believed to be owned by Greek institutional 
holders.  A restructuring that dramatically impairs the value 
of that paper could therefore place further strains on the 
Greek domestic financial sector.  Jamaica, which 
restructured its local currency debt earlier this year, had to 
walk very gingerly in designing its transaction because so 
much (perhaps as much as 75%) of the affected paper was 
held by Jamaican financial institutions. 
• European banks are the largest holders of Greek bonds.  
The stability of those institutions will be therefore very much 
on the minds of Greece’s multilateral and bilateral 
supporters should a debt restructuring prove unavoidable. 
The sovereign debts that triggered the global debt crisis of 
the 1980s were nearly all owed to international commercial 
   
7  
 
banks.  When the debt crisis broke in 1982, the official 
sector overseers of the restructuring process therefore had 
to keep one eye on the debtor countries and the other on 
the stability of the banking systems in the industrialized 
creditor countries.  It remained an uncomfortable position 
for nearly seven years until the banks had time to build up 
the loan loss reserves that permitted them to accept losses 
in Brady Bond exchanges without alarming regulators, 
stockholders or their own creditors. 
In contrast, sovereign debt crises of the last 10 years or so 
have affected mostly non-bank creditors -- hedge funds, 
pension funds, other institutional holders of emerging 
market sovereign debt, sometimes even individuals.  Those 
crises did not threaten the stability of the banking sectors in 
creditor countries. 
A restructuring of Greek debt will, in this respect, rekindle 
fretful memories of the global debt crisis of the 1980s in the 
minds of official sector observers. 
• Greece’s debt is denominated in Euros, a currency shared 
by other members of the European Union.  When a Mexico 
or a Philippines restructured debts denominated in U.S. 
dollars in the 1980s, no one -- for that reason alone -- lost 
confidence in the U.S. dollar.  This same assurance cannot 
be given about the restructuring of Euro-denominated debts 
owed by an EU Member State. 
How Might It Be Done? 
Which brings us to the main event.  If one were to attempt to 
glean the lessons of the 50 or 60 sovereign debt restructurings of the modern 
era, what would they teach about how a Greek debt restructuring should be 
managed in order to achieve a prompt, orderly and fair outcome?  There is 
one lesson from this history that is inescapable.  A sovereign debt crisis can 
be a painful experience for both the debtor and its creditors; a mismanaged 
sovereign debt crisis can be a catastrophically painful experience. 
Transaction structure.  The most likely structure for such a 
transaction would be an exchange offer -- new bonds of the Hellenic 
Republic would be offered in exchange for the Republic’s existing bonds.  
The terms of the new bonds would determine the nature and extent of the 
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debt relief that the transaction would provide to Greece.  Exchange offers 
have been the norm for sovereign debt restructurings of middle income 
countries since the first Brady Bond transactions in 1990. 
Eligible debt.  The debt eligible to participate in such an 
exchange would presumably be all outstanding Greek bonds, excluding 
perhaps the Treasury bills.  Short-term Treasury bills have been excluded 
from a number of recent sovereign debt restructurings in order to keep that 
market sweet for the government’s emergency financing needs. 
An interesting question will be whether some way can be found 
to exclude from the restructuring the bonds in retail hands, or at least to 
moderate the terms of any restructuring of those bonds.  This will depend on 
two things.  First, the total amount of bonds in the hands of natural persons 
would have to be relatively small.  Institutional holders may recognize the 
public relations benefit of not having widows and orphans complaining on the 
evening news, but only up to a point.  If the exclusion of retail holders 
appreciably increases the severity of the financial sacrifice that must be 
borne by institutional creditors, these sympathies will quickly fade.  Second, 
some mechanism must be found that will permit the government to identify 
which bonds are in retail hands when the restructuring is announced.  
Otherwise, bonds will tend to migrate temporarily into the hands of 
individuals until the restructuring storm passes over. 
New instruments.  The terms of the new instrument or 
instruments that would be offered in such an exchange will be a function of 
the nature and extent of the debt relief the transaction is designed to 
achieve.  At the soft end of the spectrum would be a simple “reprofiling” of 
existing bonds (or some discrete portion of them such as bonds maturing 
over the next three to five years) involving a deferral of the maturity date of 
each affected bond.  Uruguay (2003) stretched out the maturity date of each 
of its bonds by five years, while leaving the coupons untouched. 
At the sharper end of the spectrum would be a transaction 
designed to achieve a significant net present value (“NPV”) reduction in the 
stock of debt.  If Brady Bonds were chosen as the model for the transaction, 
this might entail allowing holders to elect to exchange their existing credits 
for either a Par Bond (a new bond exchanged at par for existing instruments, 
having a long maturity and a low coupon), or a Discount Bond (a new bond 
exchanged for existing instruments at a discount from the face amount of 
those instruments, but typically carrying a higher coupon and perhaps a 
shorter maturity than the Par Bond).  The precise financial terms of the Par 
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Bond and the Discount Bond would be calibrated to achieve an equivalent 
NPV reduction. 
CACs.  Some version of a collective action clause appears in 
most of Greece’s foreign law-governed bonds. There is no reason not to use 
these clauses to minimize the number of non-participating creditors. 
It would work as follows:  each tender of an existing bond 
containing a CAC would contain a power of attorney from the owner of that 
bond in favor of the government (or its exchange agent) to vote that bond at 
a bondholders’ meeting (or in a written action by bondholders) in favor of a 
resolution that, if approved by the requisite supermajority of holders of that 
instrument, would either cause the totality of that bond to be tendered in the 
exchange or cause the payment terms of the bond to be amended so as to 
match the terms of one of the new instruments being offered in the 
exchange.  Such a resolution, if approved by the requisite supermajority of 
holders (66% or 75% in Greek bonds governed by English law) would 
automatically bind all holders. 
Creditor consultations.  As part of the restructuring process, 
Greece would have to consult with significant holders of its paper, or with 
committees or other ad hoc groups representing those holders.  Such 
consultations would be necessary to garner widespread support for the 
restructuring.  In addition, the IMF’s so-called “Lending Into Arrears” policy 
requires a member country facing a debt restructuring to make “a good faith 
effort to reach a collaborative agreement with its creditors”. 
Credit enhancement.  If Greece’s multilateral and bilateral 
supporters were prepared to allow some portion of their emergency financing 
to be used for this purpose, Greece might be able to enhance to 
attractiveness of the new bonds it would offer in the exchange.  In the typical 
Brady Bond context, for example, the issuing countries borrowed money 
from the IMF and the World Bank and used those funds to purchase U.S. 
Government zero coupon obligations that were then pledged to secure the 
principal payment due on the Brady Bonds at maturity.  In many cases, a 
pool of cash equal to 12-24 months of interest accruals on the Brady Bonds 
was also set aside and pledged as partial security for the interest due on the 
Brady Bonds.  So the Brady Bonds represented U.S. Government risk for 
principal due at maturity, and issuing country risk for interest during the life of 
the Bond (apart from any amount pledged as rolling interest collateral). 
The negative pledge clauses in the debt instruments of the 
Brady countries did not pose an insuperable obstacle to these collateralized 
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transactions.  The commercial bank creditors waived the application of the 
negative pledge restrictions in their agreements, as did the World Bank and 
other multilateral development banks.  In the small number of cases where a 
Brady country also had outstanding international bonds, arrangements were 
put in place to post “equal and ratable security”. 
For the reasons noted above, Greece’s negative pledge 
clauses contained in bonds issued prior to 2004 would not protect holders of 
those bonds in the event that Greece were to collateralize a future Euro-
denominated issue of securities.  In the case of existing bonds with negative 
pledge clauses that would be triggered by the issuance of a new 
collateralized security, Greece would presumably seek a waiver of the 
negative pledge restrictions when it invited tenders of those issues in the 
exchange offer.  Failing receipt of such a waiver, Greece would be obliged to 
post “equal and ratable” collateral for that issue of bonds. 
Credit enhancement need not take the form of collateral 
security.  Indeed, over time, the market grew less fond of Brady Bonds and 
most countries have retired their Brady Bonds early.  Obtaining a partial 
guarantee of the new instruments from a creditworthy party is another option.  
(The Seychelles obtained a partial guarantee from the African Development 
Bank of the new debt instrument issued by the Seychelles in connection with 
its debt restructuring earlier this year.)  Another alternative would be to offer 
holders of the new instruments a continuing “put” of those instruments to a 
creditworthy party, presumably at some discount from face value.  This 
would allow an institutional holder of the paper to ensure that the instrument 
will always have a minimum floor value, no matter what happens to the 
trading price in the secondary market. 
The Tactical Implications of Local Law Bonds 
 
International investors are often leery of buying debt securities 
of emerging market sovereign issuers that are governed by the law of the 
issuing state.  Why?  Because investors fear that the sovereign might 
someday be tempted to change its own law in a way that would impair the 
value or the enforceability of those securities.  Such changes in local law 
would normally be respected by American and English courts if the debt 
instruments are expressly -- or otherwise found to be -- governed by that 
local law. 
International capital market borrowings by industrialized 
countries sometimes follow a different model.  Many of these countries have 
found that foreign investors are prepared to purchase local law-governed 
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debt securities of the sovereign.  These investment decisions are 
presumably based on a belief that industrialized countries are less likely than 
some of their emerging market brethren to risk eroding future investor 
confidence by opportunistically changing their own law in order to reduce 
government debt service burdens. 
No country in Greece’s position would lightly consider a change 
of local law as an easy method of dealing with a sovereign debt crisis.  The 
following factors, among others, counsel extreme caution before embarking 
on such a remedy. 
• If done once, future investors will fear that it could be 
done again.  The debtor country may therefore be 
compelled in future borrowings (in which international 
investor participation is sought) to specify a foreign law 
as the governing law of its debt instruments. 
• A dramatic change in local law by one country might 
allow a worm of doubt to slip into the heads of capital 
market investors in other similarly-situated countries, 
driving up borrowing costs around the board. 
• The official sector supporters of the debtor country will 
presumably balk at any action of this kind that could 
unleash the forces of contagion and instability upon 
other countries whose debt stocks also contain 
predominantly local law-governed instruments. 
• The more dramatic or confiscatory the effect of the 
change of law, the higher the likelihood that it would be 
subject to a successful legal challenge.  More on this 
below. 
One legislative measure that might be perceived as balanced 
and proportional in these circumstances, however, would be to enact what 
amounts to a statutory collective action clause.  It could operate in this way:  
local law would be changed to say that if the overall exchange offer is 
supported by a supermajority of affected debtholders (say, 75%, to use the 
conventional CAC threshold), then the terms of any untendered local law 
bonds would automatically be amended so that their payment terms (maturity 
profile and interest rate) match those of one of the new instruments being 
issued in the exchange. 
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Such a law, let’s call it a “Mopping-Up Law”, would thus operate 
in the manner of a contractual collective action clause in a syndicated debt 
instrument.  Once the supermajority of creditors is persuaded to support an 
amendment to the payment terms of the instrument, their decision 
automatically binds any dissident minority. 
Viewed another way, the Mopping-Up Law would merely 
replicate at the level of the sovereign borrower the same protection enjoyed 
by corporate borrowers in many countries, including Greece.  For example, 
we understand that in corporate reorganization proceedings under Greek 
bankruptcy law, if a plan of reorganization is accepted by two thirds of the 
affected creditors (including at least 40 percent of “privileged claims” such as 
secured or senior claims), it will -- with court approval -- bind all creditors.  A 
Mopping-Up Law would achieve a similar result but at the level of a 
sovereign borrower in need of a debt reorganization. 
Facilitating a sovereign debt restructuring through some form of 
Mopping-Up Law would be consistent with the fundamental principle that a 
sovereign debtor bears the burden of persuading its creditors that a debt 
restructuring is essential, that the terms of the restructuring are proportional 
to the debtor’s needs, and that the sovereign is implementing economic 
policies designed to restore financial health.  The only question is whether 
the sovereign must persuade every last debtholder of these elements, or just 
a specified supermajority of affected creditors.  The trend in recent years, as 
evidenced by the rapidity with which CACs have been introduced into New 
York-law sovereign bonds, is in favor of the supermajority threshold. 
Even the relatively mild step of facilitating a debt restructuring 
through the passage of a Mopping-Up Law of some kind, however, could 
draw a legal challenge.  In the case of Greece, such a challenge could come 
from three possible sources.  The first is Article 17 of the Greek Constitution.  
That Article declares that no one shall be deprived of property “except for 
public benefit” and conditional upon payment of full compensation 
corresponding to the value of the expropriated property.  The question, it 
seems to us (non-Greek lawyers that we are), is whether a mandatory 
alteration of the payment terms of a local law Greek bond in the context of a 
generalized debt restructuring could be said to impair the value of that bond; 
an instrument that, in the absence of a successful restructuring, would have 
in any event been highly impaired in value.  Also of possible relevance may 
be Article 106 of the Greek Constitution which gives the State broad powers 
to “consolidate social peace and protect the general interest.” 
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A second source of possible legal concern might lie in the 
European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols.  Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 protects the right to the “peaceful enjoyment of possessions”.  
This right may be restricted only in the public interest and only through 
measures that do not impose an individual and excessive burden on the 
private party.  That said, Article 15 of the Convention permits measures, 
otherwise inconsistent with the Convention, to deal with a “public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation”. 
Finally, foreign holders of local law-governed Greek bonds 
subject to the Mopping-Up Law might look to Greece’s Bilateral Investment 
Treaties for redress.  BITs protect against expropriation without 
compensation, as well as unfair and inequitable treatment.  It appears that 
Greece has signed more than 40 BITs with bilateral partners. 
Assuming some version of a Mopping-Up Law could survive 
any legal challenge, however, it could have significant tactical implications for 
a Greek debt restructuring.  More than 90% of Greek bonds are governed by 
local law.  If, to use our example, holders of 75% of all eligible bonds (local 
law and foreign law) were to support a restructuring, our version of a 
Mopping-Up Law should operate to ensure that more than 90% of the debt 
stock will be covered by the restructuring.  The Mopping-Up Law would not 
affect holders of foreign law bonds.  Participation by those holders would 
need to be encouraged by moral suasion and the use of contractual 
collective action clauses in the relevant bonds. 
How Long Would a Restructuring Take? 
Our guess? If done efficiently, five to six months, less if 
necessary.  
One month or so would be needed for preparation; one to two 
months for creditor consultations; one month during which the exchange 
offer would be in the market and road shows would take place; another four 
to six weeks to convene bondholder meetings for those bonds containing 
CACs, and two to four weeks to prepare for a closing. 
If done efficiently. 
 
* * * * 
 
